Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations |
I recently published a post on the Center for Leadership’s official DIME blog (see “Social Media in the U.S. Military: A New Information Center of Gravity?, Sept. 21, 2011). The DIME blog provides a forum for discussion related to elements of U.S. national power: diplomacy (D), information (I), military (M), and economics (E). My post contended that communication channels like Twitter, when used effectively by military communicators, can exert such influence that social media becomes a “new information center of gravity.”
This week, a student at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College commented on my post and disagreed with my characterization of social media as a center of gravity. The student, a military officer applying knowledge gained from his studies at the College, claimed that U.S. public support of the national and military strategy and policy was the real center of gravity. This comment prompted a response from Professor Dennis Murphy, professor of information operations and information in warfare at the U.S. Army War College. Click here to follow this commentary on the DIME Blog.
Prof. Murphy made an excellent point about the U.S. military’s responsibilities to inform rather than persuade U.S. publics. According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Principles of Information the U.S. military public affairs function (PA) is responsible for making “available timely and accurate information so that the public[s], Congress and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy.” The DoD is also responsible for making available a free flow of information, “without censorship and propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents.” The principles explain, “The sole purpose of such [information] activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public: propaganda has no place in Department of Defense public affairs programs.”
This policy, which guides the flow of public information intended for U.S. domestic audiences (including Congress and the news media), should not be confused with the doctrine and principles that guide U.S. strategic communication (SC) efforts intended for audiences abroad. Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations (11 August 2011) defines strategic communication as focused “processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance USG interests, policies, and objectives” (p. I-7). Also, the strategic communication process “occurs through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of power” (p. I-7).
Furthermore, according to Joint Publication 3-0, “The term strategic communication, an aspect of strategic guidance, applies to USG-level department and agency activities. CCDRs [combatant commanders] are the primary interface for implementing SC in the context of their theater strategies during specific joint operations. The US military plays an instrumental role in SC, primarily through IO [information operations], PA [public affairs], and DPSD [defense support to public diplomacy]” (III-15). Of note, unlike DoD public information activities that simply educate and inform, joint strategic communication efforts are designed to affect joint military operations by “gaining or maintaining the support of the relevant population” (III-15). The public affairs responsibilities in the context of joint operations extend beyond domestic public information and command information activities to include “community engagement activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in DoD” (p. III-17). The PA function is also assigned responsibility for “countering adversary misinformation and disinformation” (p. III-17).
I’ll end with a final word of caution and a few questions about the evolving nature of global public affairs and strategic communication, which I hope will stimulate further discussion. First, the caution: The boundaries that have historically delineated PA, IO, SC and other military communication functions are gradually eroding. In his landmark book, Socialnomics, Eric Qualman described the fragmentation of Internet Age publics. Qualman pointed out, for instance, that the pervasive nature of social media and the proliferation of communication outlets (blogs, Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.) means that “we no longer search for news; rather, the news finds us” (p. 9).
Now, the questions:
If news “finds us,” how can U.S. military strategic communication specialists using social media channels (e.g., Twitter) to transmit messages intended only for Afghan citizens (or even insurgents) in Kabul manage the risk that those same messages will reach unintended audiences in the United States (e.g., via re-tweets)?
Joint Publication 3-0 identifies national will as an essential instrument that supports application of national power (p. I-4). The publication also assigns responsibilities to the joint public affairs function in strategic communication for promoting and maintaining the support of U.S. national and military policies among key publics (p. III-17). Considering the combined importance of national will and international support of U.S. national and military policies, should the U.S. Department of Defense continue to limit its public affairs principles to simply informing and educating U.S. domestic audiences? Or should U.S. government officials consider integrating DoD principles of information, joint public affairs efforts, and strategic communications in ways that simultaneously foster U.S. national will, promote support of audiences abroad, and deter adversaries?
Please offer your comments.
Please offer your comments.
A thought. Whatever we do communicates something to someone. So shouldn't all communication and operations efforts be coordinated? Shouldn't the intended communication effort be a key component of every action. A bomb sends a message as much as a photo or 100,000 words -- maybe more depending on it's placement. Of course we can't broadcast every strike before hand, but we can be ready to beat the enemy to the punch -- keith
ReplyDeleteThanks, Keith. Let me respond by starting with the origins of your claim that "whatever we do communicates something to someone." This claim is rooted in the work of the so called Palo Alto Group, a group of theorists based at the Mental Research Institute, which was based in Palo Alto, Calif. Their work was published in the landmark 1967 book, Pragmatics of Human Communication, by Paul Watzlawick, Janet Beavin, and Don Jackson. The book outlined five axioms of that influenced development of interaction theory in communication. You paraphrased one axiom, which Watzlawick and Jackson described in an early journal article: "You cannot not communicate" (see "On Human Communication (1964)," Journal of Systemic Therapies, Vol 29, No. 2, 2010, pp. 53-68).
ReplyDeleteThe other axioms explain that a) every communication conveys content that goes beyond words, which includes information about how actors in the communication see and understand each other; b) the flow of communication is influenced by cycles that involve interpretations of each other's behaviors; c) communication involves verbal and non-verbal interactions; and d) communication procedures are either symmetric (based on differences, as in tit-for-tat) or complementary (based on parity).
So yes, a bomb, photo or words would send non-verbal messages that convey meaning; but the meaning is based on the interaction between senders and receivers, and the other axioms described above. So, achieving the "intended" message becomes a difficult task when you factor in the many ways that people could interact.
As far as coordination of all communication ... well, that becomes even more complicated. According to work on the symbolic interaction theory by George Herbert Meade and Herbert Blumer, joint communication actions by more than one person or group involve smaller sets of interactions. Even highly developed, well coordinated communication patterns (as in integrated communications or strategic communications), individual actions (e.g., a suicide bomb attack) can generate a need to restart or revise the group communication.
Given all of this, I agree that all communication in a group or organization should be coordinated, given the likelihood that messages will otherwise be misinterpreted. The intended communication (objective or outcome) should consider how senders and receivers will interact based on a variety of tangible and intangible factors. And, even in a successful, well-coordinate communication campaign, communicators and leaders must remain vigilant and flexible, ready to counter individual acts (e.g. strikes by adversaries) and revise group communications accordingly.